Kellstrup, Morten, 1992. "European Integration and Political Theory", p 31-44 (of 13-58), in Kellstrup, Morten (red.), _European Integration and Denmark's Participation_. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press. ----- An excerpt ----- 4. The concepts of integration and the "classic" theories of political integration. One thing is to identify EC's political system and establish a framework for characterizing its major internal and external subsystems. Another is within such a framework to specify the most important structures, processes and actors and on this basis to explain the development - or the main "dynamics" - of the system. Theories of integration can be seen as attempts to specify the dynamics of concrete, integrative systems. As mentioned, there was a blooming literature on regional integration in the I960s and in the beginning of the 1970s.42 It is beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss this literature extensively. But it is necessary for a contemporary discussion of integration theory to relate to the classic theories. My interest in the discussion of these theories is especially to lok at some of the main "patterns of explanation" within some of the main theories. First I shall include a few remarks on the concept of integration and problems related to political integration. 4.1 On the concept of political integration. The concept or integration can refer either to *a state of affairs* or to *a process*. Sometimes this can cause confusion, but normally it corresponds to every day language, and we need both meanings. As a slate of affairs, integration can in abstract be said to refer to the degree of internal coherence in a system.43 As a process the concept of integration can be said to refer to the development through which more internal coherence in a system is brought about. In politology we talk about integration in political systems, *political integration*, generally designating the degree of internal coherence in political systems. In the study of *international political integration* we are concerned with the formation of new political units or the further development of such units in the international political system.44 --- 42 Some of the most important contributions are mentioned in the list of references. An important overview of the early literature on integration is given in Lindberg and Scheingold: *Regional Integration. Theory and Research*, from 1971. Other overviews are: Pentland, 1973, Harrison, 1974, Groom and Taylor (eds.), 1986, and Groom and Taylor (eds.), 1990. And in Danish: Federspiel, 1985, and Sørensen, 1977. 43 Interesting enough integration and functional differentiation are mutually related; integration makes functional differentiation possible. This might cause empirical problems. 44 Some define political integration as the creation of supranational units, for instance Federspiel, 1985, p. 24. I prefer not to make it a condition that the increased coherence should involve supranationality. Others use a broader definition, which takes the state structure as the point of departure. Thus Charles Pentland defines "international political integration" as "a process whereby a group of poople organized at the outset in two or more independent states, comes to constitute a political whole which can in some sense be described as a community". Pentland, 1973, p. 21 and 191. l can support the use of a broad -- 31 The essence of the concept of a political system in relation to political integration is that politcal integration involves the strengthening of a political system in one or more of its dimension.45 The most important dimensions of political integration are related to the existence and strength of a decision-making process. Lindberg and Scheingold consider the strength of a system's decision-making process as the essential definition of political integration. (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, 99). Political integration as a process is in their terminology equal to increases in scope and capacity of a decision- making process. I prefer to avoid a too one-sided concentration on the institutional aspect of integration and also to include other dimensions of the political system in the definition of integration. I see a special point in including the existence and strength of a political community as an important dimension of integration. Thus, in my view *political integration has both an institutional and a normative (or identity) aspect*.46 It has to do with formal organization as well as political identity. This also implies that if we have institutional integration without a reasonably strong political community, the political integration is problematic and weak in a special way. If we have strong political communities without political institutions, we also have weak political systems, but quite different problems.47 There are many other problems in relation to the concept of political integration. There are special problems because integration theories tend to be normatively pro- integration.48 Other problems concern the relationship between on the one hand --- definition, but I prefer to let tbe concept be related to the formation of political systems, i.e. syslems with decision making processes *and* political community. 45 For a discussion of "political integration as a multidimensional phenomena", see Lindberg, 1971. 46 Ernst Haas puts more empbasis on the normative or identitive aspect of integration. His famous definition of integration is the one he used in his book on "The Unifing of Europe" in 1958. Haas defines political integration as: "the process whereby polifical actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift mheir loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states". Haas, 1958, p. 16. I prefer not to use this definition, because it a priori includes to much of a neofunctionalist interpretation. It presupposes that the essential part of political inlegration is the *transfer* of loyalities from an old lo a new cenler and seems indirectly lo exclude the possibilily that citizens are loyal to many polilical communities at the same time. We have touched on this question of political multi- identity in Buzan et al., 1990, p. 50ff. 47 For instance problems of societal insecurity. Compare the use of the institutional and identitive aspect in relation to "societal securily". See chapter four in this volume. 48 Everyone who has worked with this complex of theories will have experienced tbal il is nearly impossible to avoid statements in relation to me integrating systems which can be interpreted as being in favour of integration. For inslance in talking about "progress" in integration. I have no simple solution to the problem but recommend that we regard integration as a "dialectic" concept, implying that integration of one system normally means disintegration of other systems. 32 -- integration theory and on the other hand integration strategies and policies.49 And other problems are related to the question of "determinism" vs. "voluntarism" in explanation of integration processes.50 In addition we have the already mentioned problem of the relation between political integration and other dimensions of integration: economic,51 legal,52 socio-cultural integration and possibly other forms of integration. 3.2 On the "classic" schools within the study of international political integretion. Within the "classic" integration theories we might distinguish between different "schools". The main schools are normally - with slight variations as to the labels - classified as: 1) functionalism, 2) federalism, 3) neo-functionalism, 4) transactionalism and 5) intergovermentalism.53 In the last phase of the blooming phase of integration theories in the beginning of the 1970s, there were efforts to "integrate the integration theories" and to learn from the difficulties which were experienced in the first theoretical efforts --- 49 Inlegration theories are very often confused with strategies. Federalism, for instance, is more a political movement and a strategy for creating integration than a theory about the dynamics of integration processes. Neofunctionalism is both a set of theories and of strategies. Normally, a good strategy pressuposes a good theory, and a good theory, which also can identify the possibililies of the actors in the system, facilitates the formulation of strategies. But conceptually we should attempt to distinguish between theory and strategy. 50 This is major problem for the social sciences. Compare also note 7. My view is, in brief, that some systems are determined, others are not (maybe because they have contingency). One of the tasks for social and political scientists is to find out what kind of system we are dealing with and study the degree (and limits) of determinism. An interesting discussion of voluntarism and collectivism in inlegration theory is in Federspiel, 1985. 51 There is a dual aspect of economic integration. One aspect refers to the establisment of an international division of labour and of international markets. Another relates to the establisbment of common rules for the economy and/or common economic institutions and policies. It is significant that, in the first interpretation, the European Single Market is the formation of one market and a division of labour in the EC area, while in the other interpretation the European Single Market is essentially about passing around 300 directives. 52 A special and too neglected problem is the relationship between political and legal integration. Obviously there is a close connection between the two. It seems appropriate to operate with a seperate concept of legal integration, for instance as the creation of common legal rules and a common legal system for citizens in an area comprizing more than one state. But it should also be clear that much polilical inlegration take the form of legal integration. It seems that the above integration policy followed by the Court in the 1970s and 1980s have contribuled to an expansion of the EC-system in the period which political scientists normally regard as a period of relative stagnation of the EC. See Rasmussen, 1986, and Mancini, 1991. 53 In the theoretical literature there is a widespread agreement on which schools are most important. Yet there are some variations in the specific labels. Thus intergovermentalism is also called traditionalism or pluralism. (Pentland, 1973). Transactionalism is also called "the communication approacch". (Haas, 1971). Some, for instance Panild, operale with a school called "transgovermentalists". -- 33 in this area of study.54 But even today it is very unclear what the overall result of this self-reflection of integration theories really was, except that integration theories were soon after generally abandoned. I shall - with the danger of being repetitive for those familiar with the classic integration theories - return to the classic theories and to the problem: how do we on this backgrond theorize on regional political integration? I shall limit myself to a few comments on each of the major schools with special emphasis on thc question: what is the "essential paradigm by which each school explains integration? My contention is that these different patterns of explanations can be understood as focussing on different relation within the models presented above. In other words I want to characterize the patterns of explanation of the integration process within each school with special emphasis on using model 2 and 3 for describing the sub-systems most relevant for each school, and on this basis discuss how to proceed in the theoretical debate . Functionalism. Functionalism developed during the Second World War.55 Its main background was the expieriences from the 1930s and the war. Fundamentally the goal of the early functionalism was to establish a way of organizing the international system which could lead to peace and welfare in a period of dynamic change. The main idea was that conflicts in the international system are related to the problems between the nation states, and that these conflict can be overcome by organizing and placing authority according to functions. Form should follow functions. The result would be multitude of international organizations in different, functionally specific areas. The specialized agencies of the UN can serve as examples of such functionally differentiated organizations, however with limited authority. The idea was that many international organizations which worked effectively, each within its functional context, could provide greater efficiency, attract support, be able to respond to change in a flexible way, and contribute to peace. Within functionalism we can distinguish between a more pragmatic functionalism and the more radical or system-transforming functionalism. *Pragmatic functionalism* sees the importance of international organizations for welfare and for the creation of an international interdependence which create common interests and thus make conflicts between states less likely. It believes that functional integration in a network of international institutions can secure higher welfare and a more peaceful world. But at the same time pragmatic functionalism retains the state as the most important unit in the --- 54 see especially Lindberg and Scheingold (eds), 1971. 55 Central among the theorists of functionalism is David Mitrany, especially Mitrany, 1943/1966. For discussions of functionalism see Pentland, 1973, chapter 3, Groom and Taylor (eds.), 1975, Taylor 1975 and Taylor Issoa 1990a and b. 34 -- international system. It accepts that states can delegate and maybe "pool" their authority. But pragmatic functionalists do not seek to abolish the state, rather, to modify state interaction through a network of international cooperation organized on the basis of functional criteria. It is not least such a pragmatic functionalism which has dominated Scandinavian and British thought about cooperation in international organizations.56 The main thought in the more radical form of functionalism, what I shall call the *system-transforming functionalism*, is that by a functional organization of the entire international system it is possible to "overcome" the dominance of the nation states within the international system and to establish a "working peace system". The stages in the somewhat utopian strategy for a change of the international system are first to have the nation states delegate authority to the international organizations, and secondly to have these organizations work so effectively and efficiently that they initiate learning processes in which first the public and then the governments turn their attention more and more towards international bodies. There are many good reasons to criticise the functionalist approach, which naturally appears too naiv in this abreviated presentation. System-transforming functionalism seems utopian, technocratic, elitist and too apolitical in its belief that the performance of international organization can bring about shifts in peoples' loyalities away from the state and thereby undermine the state. Pragmatic functionalism seems more reasonable. It implies that there are limits to the possibilities of international integration, because there are limits to how much authority states will delegate. But pragmatic functionalism seems too naive in believing that states - also small states - can participate in international cooperation by "pooling" authority in common institutions without effects so binding that they might make retreat from integration extremely difficult and maybe impossible. In binding international cooperation states will, I believe, from a certain stage reach an *"integration dilemma"*; either to continue in the integration with the danger of "entrapment" or to withdraw with the danger of "abandonment".57 The pragmatic functionalism tends to ignore the integration dilemma. The essential idea in functionalism is that transfer of authority can take place to international orgarizations, and that output from the organizations will create learning processes both in the general public and in the elites and governments which will or can lead to further transfer of authority. This is in a simple form the idea of *functional spill over*. Seen in relation to model 2 above, the main idea in functionalism is that the feed back loop which consists of the link from the international authority in the center to the population and back to the international authority can expand at the expense of the --- 56 See also Tove Lise Schou's contribution to this volume. In Kelstrup, 1991, I have analyzed Denmark's foreign policy since 1945 and until 1989 as being mainly based on pragmatic functionalism. 57 See note 18. -- 35 feedback loop between the population and the state. Functionalism, though, does not (as federalism and neofunctionalism) focus on - regional international organization and it doesn't have a territorial aspect. Rather it wants international cooperation spread out between many different organizations. It seems interesting and positive that functionalism *does* deal with what I call "the functional challenge" and with gradualist learning processes in international integration. But the overall view in both forms of functionalism seems too political naive, underestimating the possible conflicts which might also prevail in functional organized systems. Federalism. To what extent we can consider "federalism" as an integration lheory is problematic. Much of what we call international or European federalism refers to political movements working for the creation of federal structures either in the whole international system or in Europe: and to their strategies for creating federalism. These movements were particularly strong in Europe right after the turn of the century, in the period between the wars and in the period after the Second World War; and they still exist as important political forces. The main goals for the European federalist can also be said to be peace and welfare. But in contrast to the functionalists they seek political initiatives for the creation of supranational (federal) structures. The federalist have primarily been occupied with the legal form of new, federal structures and with mobilizing support for these especially among elites and govemments. Thus they are much concerned with the goal of political integration. If we from the federalist strategies are to extract their theory of integration, I believe that often a very simple theory dominates: that governmental and other elites through argument and reason can be convinced of the federal idea and that if enough groups are persuaded, they have the political power to establish a federation. In essence, what I shall call the *simple federalists* have a voluntarist and formalist view on political integration, looking at it as a process dominated by political elites and decided through formal rules. There are on the other hand more sophisticated forms of federalism. One of these might be called *interdependence-federalism*: the combination of federalism with the interpretation that growing interdependence and increasing intemational economic integration create pressures which "undermine" the state and make it necessary to find common solutions to increasingly common problems, i.e. to develop federalism. Federalism might also in what is called neo-federalism combine federalist interest in the formal end-structure of political integration with the gradualist preoccupation with steps towards such goal which we find in functionalism and neofunctionalism.58 --- 58 See for instance Pinder, 1986 and 1991. John Pinder formulates seven propositions for the "neo-federal idea" which specifies neo-federalism as occupied both with the federal aim and with the steps towards it. He writes on neo-federalism. "It offers a way to supplement federalist theory, which has tended to 36 -- These "additions" to simple federalism make a clear theoretical discussion difficult. In my view simple federalism is mainly preoccupied with the relations which in model 3 I described as the relations between the national political systems and the EC- institutions. In the interpretation of this relationship, simple federalism has a voluntaristic view: that national elites can create institutional integration. The problem of simple federalism is that by focussing on such a small part of the EC-system they are unable to explain convincingly why and how this should happen. The additions to federalism might partly make up for this by including other "subdynamics" (pressure from integration, gradualist spill-over). Yet these "subdynamics" seem to be interpreted as if they always will work for integration. One does get the feeling that federalism is a too opportunistic, selective theory which consciously or unconsciously overlooks the factors which might be disintegrative (for instance features of the power balance between states or mal- functions in the institutional system). Priority to strategy over theory is not an unknown phenomena, but it is destructive for theory! At a certain stage in the integration of a political system with great territorial and/or national differences, federalism becomes relevant as a set of possible political structures of such a system. Classic federalist thought, as we know it from political theory, is about the construction and function of political federations, i.e. of political systems which through a dual political structure divide authority between the center and the units in the federation. In the latest debate about the EC, especially about the Maastrict Agreement, we see an increasing relevance of such *classic federalism*.59 I shall argue that if we are to think more constructively about the EC today, and of the "overlapping political system", we need to build on this part of political theory. An important point is that *this revival of classic federalist theory in relation to the EC is not necessarily linked to the federalist integration strategy*, and especially not to the goals of the federal movement. It is obvious - for instance from the Danish debate on the EC - that some of the opponents of the steady stream of gradual increases in the power of the EC institutions want legal/constitutional protections of their rights, in other words want a kind of federal structure. My view is that in the study of European integration it is very relevant for political science to revive federalist conceptions, but that it is problematic to build on federalist integration theory, because it is far too normative, too selective and tends to be theoretically naive. --- focus on the design of a constitution by a constituent assembly without considering the process of steps which may make that feasible; and it fills gaps in neofunctionalism caused by neglect of some essential political and economic forces, including the federalist motive, and of constitutional questions." Pinder, 1991, 217. 59 Key texts are compiled in Robert R. Bowie and Carl J. Friederich (ed.): Studies in Federalism, 1954. See also Taylor, 1991c. -- 37 Transactions analysis. The school of transactions analysis is different from the other classic integration theories because it does not focus primarily on political institutional integration but puts the main emphasis on integration at the levels of economy, socio-culture and political identity.60 As with neofunctionalism this school is related to the behavioral phase in American politology, and even more than neofunctionalism it was caught up in the positivistic orientation towards massive collection of data and nearly indiscriminating formulation of empirical theory on the basis of such data. Through the measurement of transactions in different economic and cultural regions - trade, travel, communcation etc. - the transactionalists wanted to decribe patterns of integration and i.a. to investigate under which conditions a "sense of political community" and so-called "security communities" were formed.61 The essential interest of the transaction analysis was not to study the structures and institutions of political integration. Deutsch explicitly states that security communities can be divided into "amalgamated" (understood as forming a larger unit with govermental functions) and "pluralistic" types, and "there can be amalgamation without integration, and ... integration without amalgamationn. (Deutsch, 1957, p. 6). Hence, Deutch's primary interest - and the essence of his definition of integration - is the formation of political community. The interest in institutional integration (amalgamation) was only secondary.62 Seen in relation to model 3, the main focus of the transactional school must be understood as the internal processes within the economic and socio-cultural interaction between the members of the EC. And the main view of the school would in my --- 60 The most important theorist within transaction analysis is Karl W. Deutsch. Deutsch's special interest in transaction analysis is probably best understood as a result of 1) Deutsch's special interest in nations and nation building, 2) Deutsch's pironeering work within cybernetics and communication theory, and 3) Deutsch's involvement in the behavioralist attempt to develop empirical theory. Also Donald Puchala and others contributed much to this school. Deutsch, 1954, Deutsch et al., 1957 and Puchala, 1971. 61 By a security community we understand in accordance with Deutsch: a group of people which have become so 'integrated' that they have attained, within a territory, a "sense of community" and institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. (Paraphrased from Deutch et al., 1957, p. 5). He adds: "A security-community, therefore, is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way". 62 Deutsch *had* an approach also to the study of political amalgamation. He interpreted this on the basis of the "political loads or burdens and of govermental capabilities, and of the critical nature of the balance between them". Thus the results of the project of Deutsch and othors was that "the success and failure of amalgamation, then, depended in considerable part uopn the relationship of two rates of change: the growing rate of claims and burdens uopn centrat governments as against the growing- in some instances the insufficiently growing - level af capabilities of the govermental institutions of the amalgamated political community". (Deutsch et al., 1957, p.8) 38 -- interpretation be that the formation of political community for the whole system depends on and is determined by this interaction. The institutional integration of the EC would in my interpretation of the transactionalist school be seen as secondary to the identity or normative aspect of political integration. Deutsch's contribution can today be read as a corrective to those parts of integration theory - and to politicians - which have been too occupied with the institutional aspect of integration and have tended to relative neglect of identitive and *normative* political integration. Intergovermentalism. Intergovermentalism or traditionalism, as it is also called, is sometimes seen as an integration theory. I believe this is correct, because the intergovermentalism have a rather powerful and relevant interpretation of the character of the main dynamics of the integration processes. Historically, intergovermentalists continue the tradition from the realists and traditionalists within the study of international relations in putting main emphasis on the states. Intergovermentalism was mainly born as integration theory with the reaction of the realistists and the traditionalists against other theories of integration.63 Their interpretation of the states as dominating in the integration processes corresponded better to the political realities in the period from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s than the other integration theories. The main view of the intergovermentalists is that it is primarily the state actors, their interest, their interactions, and the results of these interactions which decide the relations between the states, the integration processes and eventual institutionalizations of this process. While the main interests of the functionalist, transactionalist and the neo- functionalist integration theories were the processes which work "behind the back of the actors", the intergovermentalist interpret the integration processes as mainly decided by the states and their interrelations. The theoretical element in this kind of explanation is very simple and very voluntaristic. Seen in relation to the figure in model 3, the intergovermental interpretation postulates that it is the subsystem of the political interaction between govemments which is the dominant system in the EC-system. A couple of additions to the discussion of intergovermentalism seem relevant. First, intergovermentalistic integration theory has a certain relation to *neo-realism* (or modified neo-realism) in its interpretation of international politics. But neo-realism or modified realism attempts - on the basis of an understanding of the international system as a state- based system - to interpret the dynamics of the international system on the basis of its structure. The main thesis of neorealism is that it is the balance of power between the --- 63 Thus it was not before the early 1970s that the intergovermentalist (or traditionalists or pluralists) were counted among the integration theories. (See for instance Pentland 1973). -- 39 "poles" in the System which will decide the overall development of the system. Very seldom do intergovermentalists attempt such an expansion of their model of explanation. Second, intergovermentalism has also combined with institutionalism or neo- institutionalism.64 Also other interpretations are very close to intergovermentalism. This is partly true of "pragmatic functionalismn" which also sees the state as the "deciding" unit.65 Neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalism is the most sophisticated and complex of the classic integration theories.66 It is in many ways the most interesting of the integration theories. It contains important and sophisticated ideas about gradual integration processes, spill over mechanisms and dimensions in systems growth, and it has more theoretical refinement - not least in cybernetic modelling - than the other integration theories. At the same time it is the most difficult of the integration theories to simplify. A main reason for this - and for the complexity and partly the confusion about neofunctionalism - is that we are not just dealing with one theory. Rather neofunctionalism is a set of theories within a theoretical development with many phases. Neofunctionalism refers - as does federalism, functionalism and partly intergovermentalism - simultaneously to a theory and to a political strategy. In fact the neofunctionalist strategy was nearly dominant in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and later of the EEC and EURATOM. Also the revival of European integration since the mid 1980s has led to a new importance for neofunctionalist strategies.67 Both in theory and practice neofunctionalism can be seen as combination of federalism and functionalism. The development of the sector-functionalistic approach to regional integration which we find in neofunctionalism was in some ways a result of the failure of the federalist strategy of creating a supranational Europen integration in the early 1950's and a "compromize" which kept the federal goal, but chose a functionalistic strategy. --- 64 This is an important perspective in Keohane and Hoffmann (eds.), 1991. 65 Also the "consociationalism" which especially Paul Taylor has applied on European inlegration seems to be very close to intergovermentalism. Taylor, 1990c. 66 Among important theorists within neofunctionalism are Ernst B. Haas, Leon Lindberg, Stuart Scheingold, Philippe C. Schmitter and J.S. Nye. (See references). 67 See for example Harrison's interpretation of neofunctionalism, Harrison, 1972 and 1990. Harrison begins his article from 1990 with the statement "The neo-functionalist conception of international organization finds direct expression in the European Community". Harrison, 1990, 139. I have analyzed the neofunctionalist strategy in the Delors report in Kelstrup, 1990b. 40 -- The ultimate purpose of neofunctionalism is the creation of supranational, regional integration; a federation. But the strategy towards this goal is through a gradualist and step by slep policy to transfer authority within functionally specific sectors to the new center. Then the transfer of authority in some sectors is expected to lead to authority transfer in other sectors through different "spill over" mechanisms. This idea of "spill over" is important but also difficult to handle with precision. The general idea is that a functional integration within a certain area will or can lead to integration in other areas. It is assumed that integration will create increased support in the population, especially in the elites, and that these - preoccupied as they most likely are by their own, narrow interests - will seek influence at the new political arena, give support to this arena and thereby contribute to an expansion of integration. Often the experiece which led from the European Coal and Steel Community to the EEC and EURATOM are used as examples of successfull spill over. Seen in relation to model 2 this means that the feedback loop between the EC and the societies will or can be strengthened, while the loop between the states and the societies will be weakened.68 Another aspect of neofunctionalism is its link to liberalism and interdependence analysis. Much simplified, the idea is that economic integration will lead to pressure for political integration which might further more economic integration. This idea can be related to the relationship in model 3 between the economic interaction between the economic systems in the societies of the EC and the EC institutions. In some versions neofunctionalism has been accused of an "economistic" (or even a marxist!) interpretation of integration. It must be emphazised, though, that neofunctionalism has many varieties, and that the criticism for economic determinism is unjustified in regard to nearly all neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalism has developed in different phases. Somewhat simplified, the different phases are characterized by different interpretations of the very difficult concept of "spill over".69 In *the first phase* neofunctionalism operated with a relatively high degree of "automatic" or functional spill-over and an assumption that the integration processes had a build in "internal expansive logic". In *the second phase* the concept of automatic spill over was modified and supplemented by including "voluntaristic" or "political" spill over, i.e. spill over processes determined by the actors. Focus was in this phase especially on the role of the "central" actor (in the EC the Commission) to "upgrade the common interest" through it position in the decision making process. The expression "upgrading of common interest" was coined by Ernst B. Haas. It refers to three different ways in which conflicts can be solved with different effects on integration: --- 68 This interpretation can also be applied to figure 3 where we find the same loops, though for many countries. 69 For such a characteristic, see Federspiel, 1986. -- 41 1) "finding the minimum common denominator", 2) "splitting the difference" og 3 "upgrading of common interest". Haas writes of the last way of solving conflicts: "In terms of results, this mode af accommodation maximizes what I have elsewhere called the 'spill-over' effect of international decisions: policies made pursuant to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded, as reflected in the compromises among the states interested in the task". (Haas, 1966, 93-94). In *the third phase* of neofunctionalism it was made clear that the spill over mechanism could also depend on other actors than the central ones. It was accepted that "high politics" could block the integration processes. Undoubtebly, the experience of EC's development and especially of de Gaulle's blocking of EC policy played an important role. Further, it was recognized that the external conditions might play an important role for the integration processes. It was also recognized that there could be different attempts at establishing "linkage" and even a political competition between actors in this regard. Then in *the fourth phase* the concepts of neofunctionalism proliferated into complex understandings of the developments of integration systems. The last phase was heavily influenced by the crisis in the EC in the beginning of the 1970s. In these models, the linkage mechanism could also lead to "spill-around", "spill-back" or maybe to system breakdown .70 Much criticism has been directed against neofunctionalism. But part of this has been directed towards distorted pictures of neofunctionalism, especially against the assumptions of "automatic" spill over, abandoned rather early by the neofunctionalist themselves. Other criticisms are that the spill over concept is profoundly unclear and that the influence of external conditions on the integration processes are either ignored or not analyzed sufficiently. One criticism is also that the assumptions concerning elite- socialization (the idea that elites should shift their attention and loyalities towards the new center) doesn't hold and that even if it did, it would not lead to the formation of any political community. Other criticisms, partly connected to the previous one, are that neofunctionalism is too institutional, elitist and profoundly undemocratic. To this comes the not unimportant critisism, which had special weight in the EC crises in the 1970s: that neofunctionalist anlyses didn't correspond to the actual developments. Generally, I agree with these criticisms. But is must be added that the the criticisms are not equally justified in relation to all versions of neofunctionalism. And the many critical points should not let us forget the insight which neofunctionalism gave in relation to the "functionalist challenge". The neofunctionalists have effectively pointed to the existence of an "institutional logic" in relation to integration, and to strategies which can be followed by different actors in cultivating spill over. And they have showed many of --- 70 The extension of the discussion of "spill-over", i.a. with the concepts "spillback", "spill-around" came especially in Lindberg and Scheingold (eds.) (1971); see also Thomas Pedersen's contribution to this volume. 42 -- the mechanisms at work in systems in which there are central actors who interact simultaneously with states and groups within the states. General reflections on classic integration theories. In an historical perspective it is interesting but also a little sad that these integration theories mentioned expriences severe difficulties in the middle of the 1970s. This crisis was so deep that it resulted in a stagnation of theoretical effort concerning integration in the following 10-15 years. A satisfacotry explanation of this crisis must see it as a combination of different causes. Firstly, from the mid 1970s there was a stagnation in the actual regional integration projects, also for the EC. Secondly, empirical, behavioralist and positivistic theory was undergoing severe criticism at the universities since the end of the 1960s. Finally, integration theories had not brought reliable results. Some of the pioneers of integration research reacted by turning to other research areas. A remarkable example of this reaction is Ernst Haas who had been a pioneer in the early and the second phase (and partly also of the later phases) of neofunctionalism. In 1976 he wrote in an article with the significant title: Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration: "The phenomena of states seeking to intensify efforts at peaceful, joint management of national concerns is certainly alive, if not always well. Moreover, these efforts continue to take place in organizations and communities which define themselves as "regional". The theories we have developed for describing, explaining, and predicting this phenomenon, however, have a tendency either not to predict events very accurately or not to explain very convincingly why events which were predicted did in fact come about. We can probably devise better theories which might overcome these weaknesses. But the effort is probably not worth our while. Events in the world and conceptual developments in social sience have jointly conspired to suggest that the name of the game has changed, and that more interesting themes ought to be explored. These themes - grossly captured in the terms turbulence, interdependence, and systems-change - can profit from and incorporate aspects of the theory of regional integration. But they are sufficiently different in scope and portent as to suggest that theorizing about regional integration as such is no longer profitable as a distinct and self-conscious intellectual pursuit". (Haas, 1976. p. 174). The message 'that one could reach better theories, but that it wouldn't be worth while' seems to have been a rather unconstructive way of abandoning the integration theories. It didn't stimulate new thinking on integration but rather left the subject in a state of -- 43 chaos. The way this was done is probably one of the explanations of the many lost years in integration theory since the mid 1970s. Let us breifly look at the classic integration theories on the basis of the conceptualization of EC's political system presented in section 3. Doing so, it is striking that the theories relate to very different subsystems within the overall EC-system. In some ways each of the integration theories can be read as postulates or hypotheses which interprets the dynamics of EC's political integration as depeding on one or a few of the sub-system relations. *Intergovermentalism* is very close to being a postulate that it is the interactions and bargaining between member states which is the "dominant" subsystem within the EC's political system. *Functionalism* is close to being a postulate that there are feedback loops with gradualist expansion which can work in the interaction between the international institutions (here the EC) and the societies, and for the radical functionalism these might expand enough to undermine state authority. *Federalism* is close to being a postulate that it is possible for elites and governments to create new federal structures which then will be decisive. *Transactionalism* is close to being a postulate of the predominance of economic and especially sociocultural interaction. The early phases of *neofunctionalism* is the somewhat more sophisticated hypothesis that we are dealing with a system with many different feedback-loops and spill-over mechanisms which to a great extent can be manipulated from the center. The later neofunctionalism seems to have developed into merely being a differentiated conceptual framework for analyzing EC's institutional system in its interaction with its intrnal and (partly also) its extemal environment; a conceptual framework which is without one simple hypothesis of the main dynamics of the system and maybe too complicated to use whithout further simplifications. Naturally, this is an oversimplified picture. But the view that the different classic integration theories are located in different places on the "map" of the EC-system can lead to the hypothesis that maybe classic integration theories refer to *some* important and dynamic aspect of the EC-system, although only to a part of the dynamic forces at play. This would imply that within the big and complex EC-system different dynamic relationships are working simultaneously, interacting and maybe competing with each other, and that the total development of the EC-system depends on the relative strength and interplay of these different dynamic relationships. In such a case the interpretation of the development of the whole system is not possible on the basis of one of the dynamic relationships alone. And a major mistake in relation to the classic theories could be that they attempted to explain too much of the overall develoments of the EC-system on the basis of a very partial relationship.71 --- 71 This kind of explanatory fallacy is often called "reductionism", not to be confused with the need of making simple theories of overwhelmingly complex systems. 44 --